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Abstract
For many modem societies an inverse relationship exists between occupation/status group and 
average number of children. Within this context, the reproductive success of elites in modem 
societies has received special attention. This study tried to avoid some of the shortcomings of 
previous studies: by analyzing long time series (birth cohorts from 1820 on); by comparing 
elite reproduction not only with the total population, but also with the top occupation census 
class average; by taking into consideration infant mortality and mean generation length 
differentials; by considering sex differentials in reproduction in the second generation; by 
considering mechanisms of longterm reproduction strategies beyond fecundity differentials. 
For Germany, Great Britain and Japan a positive reproduction differential for elites is 
demonstrated. For the USA, a positive differential also is likely, but the evidence, however, is 
inconclusive, probably due to the effects of immigration and fast population growth in the last, 
and during the first decades of this century.
1. Introduction
1.1. Problem
In all known societies we can observe an unequal distribution of wealth and power. Studying 
the reproductive success of members of the national elite, who have the largest relative share 
of wealth and power at their hands - whether we take the upper .001, .01, or .1 percent of a 
society - has implications far beyond studying the demographic characteristics of any other 
small group. It has implications for the social mobility and even political dynamics of the 
society as a whole. In addition, it is a test field for central predictions of evolutionary biology.
The mechanism by which new members of the elite are recruited is an essential feature of 
every society. All other things being equal, any social mobility will be determined by a 
collusion between differential fecundity and established succession rules, which via 
inheritance laws, rules of access to education, and the constitution of the labor markets 
determine how outgoing generations are replaced by new generations.
Let us start with two extreme alternatives: In certain despotic societies rulers used to have 
large harems. Dickemann quotes a description of Chinese Imperial Harem procedures, 
"involving copulation of concubines on a rotating basis at appropriate times in their menstrual 
cycles, all carefully regulated by female supervisors ... Given nine months pregnancies and 
two or three years lactations, it is not inconceivable that a hard working Emperor might have 
managed to service a thousand women ..." An early 20th century observer reported that the 
Nizan of Hyderabad became the father of four children in the space of eight days with 9 more 
expected the following week (Dickemann 1979, 165). During the Gulf war 1991 it could be 
read that the emir of Kuweit, Sheik Jaber el Sabah has fathered about 60 children with 
bedouin girls which were brought to him on Thursday evenings. The children were adopted 
into the Sabah clan (IHT February 14, 1991). If we assume that in such societies the ruler 
certainly is not the only polygynous male, then the obvious consequence of this monopolizing 
of fertile women must have been a considerable number of never married men in the lower 
strata of society, "disenfranchised celibate men consigned to life as soldiers, brigands, monks 
and the like" (Daly and Wilson 1983, 286). In such a society a high intergenerational social 
mobility must exist which in most cases will be directed downwards; only few elite members 
will have an father who was not a member of the elite himself. If, on the other hand, we 
imagine a society, where we have an inverse relation between relative share in wealth and 
power and reproductive success, where the poorer a family is, the more children it has, then 
we should expect the predominant social mobility to be directed upwards; a considerable part 
of the elite in any generation will consist of upstarts. One can speculate whether the first 
pattern of differential reproduction was a major demographic determinant of the remarkable 
political stability of even the most despotic and unequal societies in premodem times. On the 
other hand, one may speculate, whether democracy, which among other things means the 
constant influx of new people into the top percentage of power and wealth, may have a 
reproduction pattern of the second type as one of its demographic prerequisites.
1
For many animal species, especially primates, there is a vast body of evidence in favor of a 
positive relationship between privileged access to resources via dominance rank and 
differential reproductive success (surveys to be found in Dewsbury 1982; Smith and Smith
1988). Likewise, there is a vast body of evidence in favor of a positive relationship between 
dominance rank/high status and reproductive success in traditional societies, for example, the 
Yonnut Turkmen of Iran (Irons 1979), the Yanomam5 of Venezuela (Chagnon 1979), the 
Ifalukese of Micronesia (Turke and Betzig 1985), the Ache of Paraguay (Kaplan and Hill 
1985), the rural population of Trinidad (Flinn 1986), the Kipsigis of Kenya (Mulder 1987;
1989). Reviews of additional evidence can be found in Betzig (1982; 1986) and Hill (1988). 
Similarly, a positive relationship could be established for a number of developed societies 
before industrialization: pre-industrial rural and urban Germany (Heckh 1952; Sachse 1987; 
Volland 1989; Weiss 1990), urban and village dwellers in Japan prior to 1920 (Matsumoto 
1939; Hayami 1980), Imperial China and Colonial India (Dickemann 1979), 19th century 
Mormons (Faux et al. 1984), 15th - 16th century Portuguese Nobility (Boone 1986).
For modem societies, however, most observers have noted an inverse relationship between 
high social status and fecundity: "The general relationship is a negative one: the higher 
socioeconomic status groups have the lowest fertility" (Stockwell 1968,118). Wrong (1967; 
1980) supplied a comprehensive survey of the literature before 1955. His time series can be 
extended into the present time. In tables 1 to 3 census figures are given for three of the four 
countries which will be investigated in this study. The two anglosaxon countries display an 
inverse, Germany an U-shaped relationship between occupation/status group and number of 
children, which for the vast majority of the population, however, also means a negative 
correlation.
(insert table 1-3 here)
The differential fecundity of elites in modem societies found the particular attention of many 
investigators. Members of the elites are extraordinarily successful individual members of high 
occupation/status groups. Most authors operationalize elite membership by a listing in 
biographical dictionaries of the Who-is-Who type. Some studies found a positive relationship 
between elite membership and reproductive success. Essock-Vitale (1984) demonstrated that 
the number of children ever bom to the Forbes 400 - the 400 wealthiest individuals of the 
USA - in 1982 slightly exceeded the number of children ever bom to US women in general. 
Sly and Ricards (1972) demonstrated an above average cumulative fecundity for men borne 
from before 1888 until 1923 simultaneously listed in the American Who-is-Who and the 
Social Register of 11 cities. Kirk (1957) on the other hand found a below-average fecundity 
for males in the 1956-57 volume of the American Who-is-Who. Johansson (1987) found a 
below replacment fecundity for some of the most priviledged social groups in Europe from 
early modem times to the first quarter of this century. Vining (1986) in an influential survey 
article also published original data on the American (Who-is-Who 1980/81) and Japanese 
(Jinji Koshinroku Sha 1955) elite, and for both found a fecundity below the national average. 
Interestingly, of the 27 peer commentaries accompanying Vining’s article which were written
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Number of children ever borne to married women, by occupation class of husband, Germany 
1970 Census, by year of birth and age of wife
Table 1
Year of 
Birth
1901
-05
1906
-10
1911
-15
1916
-20
1921
-25
1926
-30
Age in years 65-
69
60-
64
55-
59
50-
54
45-
49
40-
44
I. Professions, Managerial 
and Executive Positions 
(1.8%)
2.18 2.03 2.08 2.05 2.10 2.04
II Semiprofessions, 
Technical and 
Service Specialities 
(8.5%)
1.69 1.84 1.84 1.77 1.79 1.85
m  White collar workers 
and salaried employees 
(5.7%)
1.75 1.73 1.79 1.73 1.79 1.77
IV Blue collar workers, 
excl. Farm, Forest Fishing 
(15.8%)
1.91 2.02 2.09 1.98 2.00 2.12
V Farm, Forest, Fishing
Occupations
(2.3%)
2.63 2.61 2.71 2.61 2.77 2.87
Non categorized 1.97 1.93 1.83 1.73 1.73 1.84
(66.0%)
Source: Calculated from a 1% Sample of the German 1970 Census. Classes had to be defined by a blend of branch, 
school education, income level and status (worker, salaried employee, civil servant, self-employed) data in order to 
obtain data comparable to the classifications in the Anglosaxon data. Since to some of questions involved answering 
was optional, the proportion of non categorized cases is high.
Average size of completed families by occupational class and year of maniage, Great Britain, 1946 
Occupational Year of marriage
class 1890-99 1900-09 1910-14 1915-19 1920-24
Table 2
I. Professions 2.30 2.33 2.07 1.85 1.75
D. Employers 3.23 2.64 2.27 1.97 1.84
HI. Own Account 3.70 2.96 2.42 2.11 1.95
IV. Salaried 
Employees
3.04 2.37 2.03 1.80 1.65
V. Nonmanual 
Wage Earners
3.53 2.89 2.44 2.17 1.97
VI. Manual Wage 
Earners
4.85 3.96 3.35 2.92 2.70
VH. Farmersand 
Farm Mana­
gers
4.30 3.50 2.88 2.55 2.31
Vm. Agricultural 
Workers
4.71 3.88 3.22 2.79 2.71
IX. Laborers 5.11 4.45 4.01 3.56 3.35
TOTAL 4.34 3.53 2.98 2.61 2.42
Source: D. V. Class, E. Grebenik (1954, Table 4.1)
Table 2 (conL)
Average size of completed families by occupational class, Great Britain, 1971, by year of birth and age of wife, and 
by occupational class of husband (in recent Censuses a different classification of occupation was used):
Occupational Year of birth (age in years)
Class 1911-16 1916-1921 1921-26 1926-31
(55-59) (50-54) (45-49) (40-44)
I. Professional occupations
(eg. physicians, lawyers) 1.81
n. Managerial and lower 1.76
professional occupations 
(eg. sales manager, teachers)
MN. Non-manual skilled 1.64
occupations (eg. clerks, 
shop assistants)
HIM. Manual skilled 1.96
occupations (eg. bricklayers, 
underground coal miners)
IV. Partly skilled occupations 2.01 
(eg. bus conductors, postmen)
VI. Unskilled occupations 2.21
(eg. porters, ticket 
collectors, general laborers)
Non-manual 1.73 1.82 1.93 2.10
Manual 2.01 2.07 2.17 2.36
1.89 2.02 2.21
1.86 1.96 2.12
1.72 1.82 1.99
2.03 2.13 2.32
2.07 2.17 2.38
2.27 2.43 2.67
Source: Fertility Report from the 1971 Census, HMSO 1983, Table 9.8
Numbers of children ever bome per 1000 native white once married women of completed fertility by occupational 
class. Rates standardized for duration of marriage. USA
Table 3
Age in years in 1910 70-74 65-69 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49
Year of Birth 1836
-40
1841
-45
1846
-50
1851
-55
1856
-60
1861
-65
Major Occupation Group
I. Professionals, 
Semi-professionals
4,714 4,770 4,027 3,926 3,635 3,335
II. Proprietors, 
Managers, and 
Officials
4,547 4,290 4,139 4,061 3,900 3,605
m . Clerical, Sales, 
Kindred Workers
4,393 4,146 3,966 3,883 3,558 3,430
IV. Service Workers ------ 4,583 4,574 4,647 4,451 4,052
V. Craftsmen, Fore­
men and Kindred 
Workers
4,844 4,716 4,651 4,584 4,405 4.283
VI. Operatives and 
Kindred Workers
4,837 4,661 4,662 4,877 4,553 4,556
VII. Laborers except 
Farm and Mine
5,643 5,374 5,010 5,323 5,114 4,866
Vm. Farmers and Farm 
Managers
5,517 5,738 5,639 5,775 5,586 5,450
IX. Farm Laborers, 5,557 5,590 5,513 5308 4,970 5,102
Foremen
Total Gainfully
Employed
5,206 5,197 5,022 5,059 47941 4,579
Numbers of children ever borne per 1000 native white once married women of completed fertility by occupational 
class of husband. Rates standardized for duration of marriage. USA
Table 3
Age in years in 1910 70-74 65-69 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49
Year of Birth 1836
-40
1841
-45
1846
-50
1851
-55
1856
•60
1861
-65
Major Occupation Group
I. Professionals, 
Semi-professionals
4,714 4,770 4,027 3,926 3,635 3335
II. Proprietors, 
Managers, and 
Officials
4,547 4,290 4,139 4,061 3,900 3,605
in . Clerical, Sales, 
Kindred Workers
4,393 4,146 3,966 3,883 3,558 3,430
IV. Service Workers ------ 4,583 4,574 4,647 4,451 4,052
V. Craftsmen, Fore­
men and Kindred 
Workers
4,844 4,716 4,651 4,584 4,405 4.283
VI. Operatives and 
Kindred Workers
4,837 4,661 4,662 4,877 4,553 4,556
VII. Laborers except 
Farm and Mine
5,643 5,374 5,010 5,323 5,114 4,866
Vm. Farmers and Farm 
Managers
5,517 5,738 5,639 5,775 5,586 5,450
IX. Farm Laborers, 5,557 5,590 5,513 5308 4,970 5,102
Foremen
Total Gainfully
Employed
5,206 5,197 5,022 5,059 47941 4,579
Table 3 (cont)
Age in years in 1940 70-74 65-69 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44
Year of Birth 1866
-70
1871
-75
1876
-80
1881
-85
1886
-90
1891
-95
1896
-1900
Major Occupation Group
I. Professionals, 
Semi-professionals
3,108 2,778 2,638 2,247 2356 2,253 2.138
n. Proprietors, 
Managers, and 
Officials
3,402 2,976 2,719 2,623 2,441 2,374 2.224
m . Clerical, Sales, 
Kindred Workers
3,110 2,766 2,407 2,385 2,279 2,256 2.127
IV. Service Workers 3,840 3,152 3.025 2,958 2.877 2.782 2.597
V. Craftsmen, Fore­
men and Kindred 
Workers
3,943 3,347 2,909 2,981 2,877 2.830 2.642
VI. Operatives and 
Kindred Workers
4,315 3,774 3.291 3,149 3,121 2,983 2.893
VII. Laborers except 
Farm and Mine
4.637 4,124 3.567 3,407 3,598 3,496 3.248
VEH. Farmers and Farm 
Managers
5,250 4,606 4,176 4,116 4,035 3,946 3.732
IX. Farm Laborers, 
Foremen
5,056 4,484 3,869 3,971 3,911 3,960 4.002
Total Gainfully 4,324 3,808 3,328 3,214 3.099 2,989 2.793
Employed
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, (1943-47)
Table 3 (cont)
Age in years in 1950/60/70 45-49 40-44 45-49* 40-44* 35-44**
Year of Birth 1901
-05
1906
-10
1911*
-16
1916*
-20
1925**
-34
Major Occupation Group
IProfessional, 
technical, and 
kind, workers
1.751 1.812 2.002 2.311 2.884
ILManagers, 
officials and 
propr’s excL fanning
1.978 1.942 2.074 2.336 2.941
HLClerical, 
and kind, workers
1.928 1.853 1.971 2.214 2.854
IV.Savice 
workers incl. 
priv. household
2.416 2.164 2.291 2.426 3.024
Sales worker + - - 1.929 2.244 2.888
V.Craftsmen, 
foremen, and 
kind, wokers
2.480 2.399 2.389 2.548 3.118
Vl.Operaiives and 
kind, workers
2.753 2.612 2539 2.690 3.221
vniabarers, except 
farming and mine
3.356 3.162 2.933 2.968 3.384
VinJFanners, 
farm managers
3.510 3.344 3.060 3.166 3.565
IXJFarm laboreres 
and foremen
4.222 3.980 4.146 4.017 4.260
All other + 2.774 2.692 2.145 2.312 -
Total Gainfully 
Emoloved
2.525 2.410 2.353 2.534 3.065
+ categories not used in previous censuses Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1955,1964*,1973**)
Year of birth
Table 3 (conL)
Age in years in 1980
Major Occupation Group
I. Managerial and Professional 
Speciality Occupations
ü . Technical, Sales, and Administrative 
Support Occupations
in . Service Occupations
IV. Fanning, Forestry and Fishing 
Occupations
V. Precision Production, Craft 
and Repair Occupations
VI. Operators, Fabricators 
and Laborers
VU. Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, 
Helpers and Laboreis
Total Gainfully 
Employed
35-44
1935-45
2.464
2.548
2.848
3.330
2.871
3.025
3.136
2.736
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1984). In the 1980 census a new classification of occupation groups was used.
by eminent experts on the subject, only 6 raised doubts on the empirical validity of the inverse 
relationship between status and reproductive success in modem societies, which Vining had 
presented as the general result of the research in this field. This strong numerical support for 
the elite undeneproduction hypothesis seems to be representative for many demographers’ 
perception of the issue (for example in Davis et al. 1986).
A related subject which also has found intense attention for decades is the relation between 
measured intelligence (IQ) and fecundity. It is common knowledge, that measured intelligence 
(IQ) displays positive correlations with educational level and socioeconomic status. Many 
studies from the 1920s to the present (surveys to be found in Anastasi (1956) and in 
Retherford and Sewell (1988)) seem to demonstrate an inverse relation between fecundity and 
measured intelligence - for women even more inverse than for men - in addition to the 
ubiquitious inverse relations with educational level (which for developed countries cannot be 
explained any more as an effect of demographic transition still in progress) and 
socioeconomic status. Hermstein (1989) in his widely quoted article on "IQ and the falling 
birth rate" - which found the distinction to be the sole issue of a 4 column article in 
NEWSWEEK (Cowle 1989) titled "Are the best and brightest making too few babies?" - 
states it as common knowledge that there is a "redistribution of childbearing towards lower 
social strata" in industrial societies.
The common interest of authors in both fields focusses on the theoretical question how these 
inverse correlations can be made compatible with the very essence of modem evolutionary 
theory. In addition, investigators claimed dysgenic population effects form this inverse 
relationship, and even tried to estimate the resulting IQ selection differential, the IQ 
population average change over one generation, which Retherford and Sewell (1988) for then- 
large Wisconsin sample calculated to be eight-tenths of an IQ point decline in a generation. 
Accordingly, they found the top IQ decile to be the least fit in Darwinian terms, with a relative 
fitness of .788 for women and .858 for men measured against the most fecund decile (which 
for women was the second lowest, for men the fourth lowest decile).
Membership in a high status group and especially an elite position is not only in cultural, but 
also in biological terms very attractive: on the average you can enjoy a healthier and longer 
life. Infant mortality is lower among elites. A high income provides the means of raising and 
educating more children than the average, a high position gives more opportunities for 
protection and placement of offspring. All these advantages are attractive not only for the 
observer: one of the characteristic features in particular of modem societies is the lifelong 
energy with which so many people compete for power, possessions and prestige. Many of the 
physical and psychic properties, which, like health, vigor, attractiveness and risk-taking, 
promote professional success, also come along with an enhanced biological potential for 
reproductive success. Thus, it is understandable that many of the quoted authors see the whole 
Darwinian paradigm being challenged, if it can be demonstrated that, as a regular
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phenomenon in modem societies, people in highstatus groups do not transform their above- 
average access to scarce resources into an above-average reproductive success. One may ask, 
why the potentially fittest are not the actual fittest?
1.2. Methodological Problems
The quoted studies, however, suffer from serious deficiencies, which make it difficult to 
justify the far reaching conclusions many authors drew from them. Six such deficiencies can 
be listed:
1.2.1. Time series: The data basis for all these elite studies is surprisingly small, given the 
easy access to elite biographical dictionaries of the kind used. In most cases only cross- 
sectional, but no longitudinal analyses have been performed. For total populations, as well as 
for broader defined occupation/status classes there are time series available with census data 
over 100 birth years (Wrong 1980, or tables 1 to 3). Proponents of the elite underreproduction 
hypothesis contend that the reported positive relationship between elite status and 
reproduction was only a transitory, shortlived phenomenon of the relative short period of birth 
cohorts 1915-1935 - the parents of the baby boom. Opponents of the elite underreproduction 
hypothesis, on the other hand, interpret the inverse relationship reported for the cohorts borne 
before WW I as a transitory phenomenon reflecting the demographic transition from a high 
fecundity, high mortality society to a low fecundity, low mortality society, which simply may 
have taken place in elites 1-2 generations earlier than in the general population. Clearly, long 
time series from the time of demographic transition on would have to be taken into account.
1.2.2. Fecundity differentials within and between status groups: The borderlines between 
status groups, permeable as they may be in modem societies, also mark borderlines betwen 
marriage markets. Evolutionary competition is always competition with neighbours in space, 
time and social proximity. Evolutionary theory would require not only that the top percentiles 
of the top status groups in society have a reproductive performance above the national 
average, but also above the average of the marriage market they belong to.
Given the attention the inverse correlation between status groups and fecundity in 
industrialized societies has received, surprisingly little research has been done on fecundity 
differentials within occupation/status groups. Haggod (1948) studied the effects of farm size 
on completed family size of farmers in the USA. In the nation as a whole, findings were 
inconclusive. In urbanized states like Ohio and New York a positive relation existed, in the 
South the relation was negative. Wrong (1980) cites several studies, mostly from the twenties, 
which demonstrated a positive relation between income and number of children for the alumni 
of several American universities. XXXXX (1991a) has investigated the professional and 
reproductive biographies of a class of United States Military Academy graduates, and found a 
positive correlation between final rank and number of children.
Indirect evidence that such a positive correlation may exist at least in the highest status groups 
can be found in the reverse J-form of the relation between income and number of children - 
for the largest part of society an inverse, but for the few top income percentiles a positive 
correlation between income and number of children (often not visible in the broad income
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categories of usual census data) - which is reported for many modern societies (Wrong 1980, 
275ff.). The reverse J-form would be consistent with the notion of an inverse relation between 
income/status groups and average fecundity, but a positive relation between income and 
fecundity within income/status groups. Freedman (1963) found such a pattern for respondents 
in a random sample of the US total population who practised family planning.
1.2.3. Social differentials in mortality: A child with a greater chance of reaching 
reproductive age has a greater reproductive value. Mortality differentials for infants, children, 
adolescents - which are all positive for the elites - have to be taken into account The need for 
this becomes even more pressing the farther back into the past longitudinal fecundity data 
shall be compared
1.2.4. Fecundity Parameters: In the general design of the quoted studies own number of 
children of all currently or all ever married male members of the elite is compared with 
completed fecundity rates of all currently or all ever married females of the general 
population. Female elite members, being a rare species anyway, usually are disregarded. 
Because of a different age composition and different age specific marriage rates of the two 
sexes usually cohort specific completed fecundity rates of females are not identical with those 
of males. Migration in reproductive years may not play a significant role, but fecundity related 
mortality differentials may cause average number of own children to differ from the CFR of 
the same cohort. In the quoted studies, there is no discussion of this point
1.2.5. Sex differentials in reproduction: Furthermore, there may be sex differentials in 
fecundity within status groups. If females borne into a certain status group have a fecundity 
below the one of males, concentrating on the number of children borne to males alone may 
lead to overestimating the reproductive success of males, in contrast to status groups where 
there is no such bias.
Female members of the elite who frequently have a member of the elite as father seem to have 
a fecundity far below the one of male members (Kiser and Schacter 1949; Mackey and Coney 
1987; XXXXX and YYYYY 1991). Maybe the daughters of elite members in general may 
not have the same number of children as the sons, and consequently the reproductive success 
of elite families may be overstated by the number of children which their male members have. 
Such a sex differential could be well understood from population theory. In all sexually 
reproducing species males display a higher variance of fecundity than females: in human 
societies there are always more childless men than childless women and more men with many 
children than women with many children; this differential variance comes along with rank 
differences (for references see Daly and Wilson 1983, 323): high status males have more 
offspring than high status females, while low status males have fewer offspring than low 
status females. The obvious consequence is that in high status groups sons should have a 
higher reproductive potential, in low status groups daughters. If, furthermore, there is a 
positive relationship between an individuals’s rank, (which means: differential access to 
precious resources), and the offspring’s rank, the Trivers-Willaid (1973; Sieff 1990 for a
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review of recent literature) hypothesis predicts that in high status groups parents should invest 
more in sons, in low status groups more in daughters.
In a brilliant study Boone (1986) demonstrated this for the closed marriage market of the 
medieval Portuguese nobility.
1.2.6. Differential fecundity and differential reproduction: Evolutionary competition is 
about reproduction differentials. In the elite studies quoted above without exception 
differential cumulative fecundity rates or differential numbers of children ever borne are used 
as measures of differential reproductive success. Stochastic models of evolution show how 
problematic this equation is, especially in populations with little or zero growth.
The ultimate measurement for reproductive success is the probability of one’s family lineage 
of not becoming extinct in the future (Weigel and Blurton-Jones 1983). This measure is well 
defined, since it converges after a few generations. Having on the average more children than 
the competition may be just one mechanism of achieving this goal. An even more effective 
mechanism may be reducing the variance of fecundity, in particular the frequency of 
childlessness, within the family lineage. All other fecundity parameters being equal, this can 
considerably increase longterm reproductive success, especially in zero growth populations 
(Ellison 1983, XXXXX 1991a). The effect becomes even stronger, if there is an effective 
ceiling on the maximum number of offspring a couple can produce.
2. Method
2.1. Purpose of the study: The study presented here focusses on the most basic aspect of the 
whole issue: whether the elites in modem societies reproduce above, below or just on the 
average of the total population as well as of the top occupation/status groups. The latter will 
be regarded as proper marriage market of the elites, where they compete against each other 
and against all other group members for reproduction chances. Evolutionary theory would 
predict that not only the elites, but the top occupation/status group as a whole will reproduce 
above the average of the total population. This question, however, will not be an issue of the 
study (save a few considerations in 4.).
Only in a limited scope the study will deal with explanations of eventual differentials. 
Clarifying for what explanations can mean in this context, is the distinction between ultimate 
and proximate explanations.
Ultimate explanations refer to the evolutionary function of an observed behavior If a positive 
reproductive differential for elites can be demonstrated, their better access to scarce resources 
will be regarded as the ultimate explanation for that differential. In all species on this planet 
observed so far, individuals compete for scarce resources, because above average access to 
resources provides above average reproduction. Since humans are just a recently evolved 
species, this explanation of a positive reproduction differential of elites, if it can be 
demonstrated, will be considered sufficient on the level of ultimate explanations. Should it be 
found, however, in all, or in some of the analyzed societies, that elites reproduce below the
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average of their societies, additional explanations would be required. It could be argued that 
the fecundity parameters which were used are wrong or incomplete indicators of reproductive 
success. Or we could argue that elite members and those who desire to become ones are 
maladapted because they compete for resources which in industrialized environments do not 
pay off in positive reproductive differentials any more (Boyden 1987). Or it could be 
speculated that modem societies as a whole are not subject any more to the selection 
principles which have shaped the previous evolution of the human species.
A completely different type of explanations would refer to the proximate causes of any 
reproduction differential: the immediate mechanisms by which differential access to resources 
actually is translated into differential reproduction. Many mechanisms would have to be 
considered: transfer payments from parents to young couples, pronatalist values, better 
medical care and therefore fewer wasted pregnancies, or more efficient direct support 
networks in families of the elite, and so on, in the case of positive differentials; later marriage, 
higher divorce rates, more emotional investment per child, alternative pleasures in life, and so 
on, in the case of negative differentials. The two types of explanation are complementary: the 
explanation of the ultimate causes is incomplete, as long as it is not shown how the observed 
behavior actually is produced, but any proximate explanation remains meaningless until the 
evolutionary function of the observed behavior is clarified. Given the purpose of this study, 
proximate explanations of any observed reproduction differential are beyond its scope. 
Explanations of the relative size of eventual differentials - possibly an indicator of the 
intensity of the evolutionary competition involved - also cannot be expected here. 
Furthermore, as long as there is no consensus about the most basic facts of the issue, the 
differential reproduction of elites, it makes litde sense to speculate about its possible social 
and political consequences.
The study has been designed in order to avoid the deficiencies of previous studies, as 
mentioned above.
1. Time series: The reproductive success of random samples of male members of the national 
elites of Germany (n=1757, birth cohorts 1820-1939, lowest number per 10 year cohort: 114), 
Great Britain (n=1473, birth cohorts 1810-1939, lowest number per 10 year cohort: 96), Japan 
(n=1101, birth cohorts 1830-1939, lowest number per 10 year cohort: 99) and of the USA 
(n=1014, birth cohorts 1860-1939, lowest number per 10 year cohort: 107) was compared 
with the reproductive success of the general population of these countries. These countries 
have been chosen as four major industrialized and urbanized countries of the world. France, 
Italy and the Soviet Union did not qualify because of the poor quality of available sources. 
Thus, time series from early demographic transition on were made available. One of the 
nations analyzed is non European, two of them were victorious in the two world wars, while 
the other two were defeated at least in one. The four countries’ history of institutions, labor 
markets and the economy is quite different Thus, common demographic features cannot 
easily be regarded as non-generalizable features of a very peculiar type of society.
2. Fecundity differentials within and between status groups: Fecundity differentials were 
analyzed not only between elite and general population, but also between elite and the top
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occupation group (professions and managerial positions) in census data, where available, in 
order to compare fecundity differentials also within the marriage market to which most elite 
members belong.
3. Social differentials in mortality: Class differentials in infant mortality together with 
cohort life tables have been used in order to calculate the differential reproductive value of a 
child borne into an elite family in comparison to the average population.
4. Fecundity Parameters: Differences between own number of children and cumulative 
fecundity rates have been given careful consideration. In addition, by using a dataset of 359 
pairs of fathers and sons listed in the British Who-is-Who at subsequent times, sex and class 
differences in age at marriage and mean generation length have been taken into account.
5. Sex differentials in reproduction: It has been tried to assess eventual differences in 
reproductive performance between male and female offspring of elite members, by comparing 
sex differences in reproductive performance in the top educational level census classes, and 
other status group dimensions from original data.
6. Differential fecundity and differential reproduction: Conclusions from observed 
fecundity differentials to longterm reproduction differentials will be discussed.
The study concentrates on male elite members’ fecundity, since most elite positions are 
occupied by males, since the whole debate has been on male elite members only, and since the
- still very small - population of female elite members in the sources has undergone 
considerable changes in size and composition, which call for separate analysis.
2.2. Time series:
2.2.1. Sources: Many of the elite fecundity studies in modem societies use elite dictionaries of 
the Who-is-Who type for sampling as well as for data collection. The earliest of these 
dictionaries was published in the middle of the last century, (first Who-is-Who in England 
published in 1847); from 1890 on they show the same composition as today (Who-is-Who in 
Great Britain 1892, Who-is-Who in America 1897, Jinji Koshinroku Sha in Japan 1906, Wer 
ist’s in Germany 1905). At present, they include about .01 - .05 percent of the total 
population. Admission in these sources is based on either of two factors: a) the position of 
responsibility held, or b) exceptional achievements in the course of any noteworthy career (see 
"Standards of Admission" in the Who-is-Who in America 1990). Examples for the first type 
are high positions in Government, Administration, Judiciary, Business, Associations, Military, 
Religious Communities, Science, Media; for example, members of the national parliament, 
senior military officers from the rank of major-general upwards, editors of newspapers with a 
certain minimum circulation, ranking members of the National Medical Association, or the 
National Bar Association. The second type is represented by well known artists, architects, 
authors, scientists, or leading activists in civil movements. Admissions of the first type are far 
more frequent. Some data about the listed persons may have been previously known to the 
editors, but the bulk of the data is obtained - usually by a mailed questionnaire - from the 
listed persons themselves. Readiness to reveal personal data about marriages, children etc. 
varies visibly.
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Considering all practical problems in operationalizing elite membership, the selection is not 
too badly taken. Celebrities which one would rather not count as elite members (Olympic 
games winners, movie stailetts) are not very frequent Some professions (lawyers and 
architects), self-employed entrepreneurs, and owners-investors may be underrepresented. It is 
unknown which proportion of all those who in principle would qualify are actually selected. 
Any resulting bias in sampling, however, does not matter for the purpose of this study as long 
as it is unlikely that the bias correlates with reproductive success. Elite segments are 
differently represented in various countries (in Germany many listings are university 
professors, in Indonesia senior military officers, in Japan businessmen). Artists and writers in 
all four nations (between 1% and 5% of the samples) have a significantly lower fecundity than 
all other professions. Versellier (1989) found similar differentials in France. Artists and 
writers sometimes may exercise great influence on public opinion, but despite all the fame 
they may enjoy they lack the very essence of an elite position, something which all the others: 
judges, generals, bishops, chief surgeons, university presidents, CEOs, publishers etc. have: 
immediate power over other people. Therefore, artists and writers were excluded from 
analysis. In addition, there is a problem with differential age at entrance: Scientists or 
politicians will qualify for admission earlier in life than military officers, judges, or union 
leaders, resulting in different staying time in the sources.
Sampling bias by profession can be dealt with by controlling for profession specific fecundity 
differentials (see below). Sampling bias by age at entrance can be dealt with by drawing 
individuals only between age 49 and older, which is justified if there is no correlation between 
fecundity and longevity beyond age 49 which indeed in none of the four datasets could be 
detected. Individuals who die before age 49, may have a lower cumulative fecundity, and also 
have a lower chance of being listed in the source at all; such indivduals, on the other hand, do 
not contribute to the family completed category in census data either. Since elites at all ages 
have a below average mortality, except maybe among young military officers in wartime 
(Lancaster 1990,316 with further references), any bias from excluding younger individuals 
could be expected to decrease the measured fecundity differentials of elites, and therefore 
would not be harmful for the purpose of the study.
2.2.2. Variables: The following data were documented for each individual in the samples:
- date of birth, date of death. A person drawn was followed through subsequent volumes until 
exact date of death could be determined. Otherwise the last year of listing was documented.
- Profession/activities was documented in one of the following categories: 1) Arts, Literature, 
Music; 2) Business, managers; 3) Clergy; 4) Media; 5) Academic Institution: Humanities, 
Social Sciences; 6) Academic Institution: Natural Sciences; 7) Politician; 8) Medicine; 9) 
Legal profession; 10) Architects, self employed engineers, and other professions (few 
cases); 11) Military; 12) Public Administration; 13) Inherited wealth, landowner
- titled or not (in Japan: Kazoku (nobility) Shizoku (gentry) Heimin (commoner))
- university/college graduation
- number of daughters and sons, adopted daughters and sons, deceased children.
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Usually not much more infoimation can be obtained from the listings. Religion was not 
documented because many subjects did not report religious affiliation. With the exception of 
Roman Catholic priests only veiy few subjects were recognizable as unmanied, once artists 
and writers were excluded. Number of marriages, however, was not documented because 
there seemed to be a underreporting of previous marriages, as a check of some listings 
showed, which were known as divorcees or widowers.
2.2.3. Data completeness and quality: A serious problem is underreporting. If the addressees 
do not respond at all (rarely), only name, profession/activities, and office address are listed in 
the dictionary. As a general rule, listings with only these data were not included in the sample.
The sources available for the four countries markedly differ in completeness. In the Japanese 
sources, apparently there was only a small amount of underreporting, and the data could be 
used as they came in. In the three Western nations, however, the sources are incomplete, and 
the raw data had to be corrected. Readiness to disclose details of marital and reproductive 
biography vary considerably, and so do the motives for withholding information about one’s 
own family. A person may mention his famous father, but may not tell about his wife. A 
person may leave the column "children" empty, because there are no children, because his 
children have died, or because he is afraid of kidnapping or blackmailing. Making inferences 
from information given to information missing often is impossible. Therefore, rather than 
estimating the true childlessness rates from the rates of nonresponders, a different approach 
was chosen.
In order to know about the fecundity of nonresponders in biographical dictionaries of this 
kind, a mailed survey was conducted among 400 men listed in the German Wer-ist-Wer 
volume 1989, with 200 men having reported children, 200 not These men were asked about 
marriages and children. Return rate in both subgroups was about 90%, with the following 
results:
1) If a person had reported children at all, this number was correct. In rare instances, the 
number of sons and daughters were confounded. Deceased children always had been 
mentioned, but often not as deceased.
2) The distribution of number of children among those who had children, but had not reported 
them, was about the same as the distribution among those who had reported children.
3) Explicit statements of childlessness are very rare in the Wer-ist-Wer. Thus, practically all 
childless individuals had to be found in the group of nonresponders. The number of never- 
married men in the German elite (with exception of the easy-to-recognize catholic clergymen) 
is very small, while the proportion of childless ever married men at present is about 10 %.
Estimations of the proportion of childlessness, in the elite as well as in the general population 
are notoriously difficult. Childlessness ratios in the German 1970 census were: cohort 1870- 
79 17%, 1880-89 18%, 1900-1909 21%, 1910-19 15%, 1920-29 14%, 1930-39 12% 
(calculated by the author) with the top occupation/status class being at 80-90% of the total 
population. For the USA there are consistent and reliable childnessless rates for ever married
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women with reproductive life span completed, from census material (Festy 1979, Glass et al. 
1954): birth cohorts 183645 8.0%, 1846-55 8.4%, 1856-65 9.3%, 1866-75 14.4%, 1876-85 
15.9%, 1886-95 15.3%, 1896-05 15.4%, 1906-15 18.6%, 1916-25 11.4%, 1926-35 8.6%, 
1930-39 7.0%, 1936-45 6.6%, 1940-49 9.4%. The increase for the cohorts 1866-99 may have 
been due to the spread of veneral diseases with their negative consequences for fertility which 
gave rise to strict disease control laws in most industrial countries. A data set of 1179 British 
industrialists from cohorts 1790-1929 (Dictionary of Business Biography 1984-86) with 2-8 
page biographies per individual) showed a mean childlessness of 11.5%, again with the 
maximum in the cohorts 1866-1899. Sly and Ricards who also had mailed questionnaires to 
individuals with incomplete data reports, found 7.5% childless ever married men in their US 
elite sample.
Therefore, rather than trying to estimate true childlessness rates from the biographical material 
in the elite dictionaries, it will be assumed that:
1) All male elite persons listed, which are not explicitly recognizable as never married, are 
considered to be ever married (Most men are explicitly listed as married).
2) Childlessness among married male elite members is estimated to have been 10% until the 
1860-69 cohort, and from the 1920-29 cohort on, and 15% for the cohorts between. The mean 
number of children listed by persons with children will be weighted accordingly. Given that 
childlessness among ever married females in the top occupation/status class in census data 
was 80-90% of the population average, these estimates are probably too high, which, 
however, is not undesirable for the purpose of this study.
Since only very few children are listed as deceased, since it is known from the survey among 
German non-responders that many deceased children are not listed as such in the sources, and 
since date of death would be unknown anyway, mortality among respondents’ children could 
not be estimated from the data and another approach had to be used (see 2.4.)
2.3. Fecundity differentials within status groups: Fecundity comparisons within the broader 
marriage market to which most elite members belong (top occupation/status class) are easy for 
the two anglosaxon countries (see tables 2 and 3), for Germany possible only from the 1900s 
on, but difficult for Japan, because there are no prewar census data on class differentials in 
fecundity. There are some data available from surveys (Matsumoto 1939), which are, 
however, are of little value for this purpose.
2.4. Children mortality differentials: Most markedly in the last century, infant and 
adolescent mortality was lower in the elites than in the general population. This was not 
always the case: in premodem societies with their poor hygenic conditions, mortality and 
especially infant mortality differentials were more geographic rather than social (Johansson 
1986; Mosk and Johansson 1986 with additional references). Since there are no specific life 
tables for the elites, the following method was applied for estimating the differential mortality 
and, consequently, the differential reproductive value of elite children:
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1. Differential infant mortality in the elite of cohort C (q^  or q^) was retrieved from specific 
sources or estimated (see below);
2. From the generation life tables of that particular society a cohort C* was selected, which for 
the general population displayed the same infant mortality as the elite of cohort C. Analysis of 
the data set of Father - Son pairs in the British Who-is-Who displayed 42 years mean length of 
generation for the 1820-29 cohort, coming down gradually to 35 years for the 1930-39. Sons 
of elite members, however, marry later than daughters. Therefore mean age at reproduction 
unifonnely was set at 30 years. Probability p is the probability of surviving to mean age at
v j J v
reproduction for the general population of birth cohort C. Probability p’^  of surviving to
mean age at reproduction in the lifetable of cohort C* was taken as the probability of an elite 
family’s child, bom in cohort C to live through that age.
3) The quotient p* __/p_ was interpreted as the relative chance of an elite child of cohort C, in
comparison to an average child of cohort C, to reach mean age of reproduction.
4) For every individual case in the data set, number of children was multiplied with this 
quotient p’^  ^q/Pq of the cohort 35-42 years later than his own birth cohort.
The reasoning behind it was that the survival patterns in this particular society are the same in 
all strata of society, only with the exception that the elite is more advanced: it displays an age 
specific survival pattern in cohort C which the general population does not achieve before 
cohort C \ Social mortality differentials in the second half of this century in the societies 
analyzed here have become very small anyway. This approach seemed to be better than using 
model life tables, since for three countries studied here cohort specific life tables are available. 
For Japan there are no class differentials in mortality rates available anyway, and an 
alternative approach had to be taken. Details of computation are given for each country below.
2.5. Methods of comparisons
In the published studies number of children ever borne to male elite members was compared 
with completed fecundity rates of females of the same birth cohorts in the general population. 
This approach is not without problems. If number of children ever bom (CEB) of individuals 
of one cohort surviving to age 50 is compared to the CFR of this cohort, then, provided 
migration is nonexistent:
- if mortality and fecundity do not correlate CEB -  CFR
- if there is a hypomortality of hyperfecund individuals CEB > CFR
- if there is a hypermortality of hyperfecund individuals CEB < CFR.
Hypofecundity partly is the result of fertility disorders (inborn and acquired). Some of those 
diseases will be associated with hypermortality, therefore in general for male individuals
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CFR^ p < CEB^1. Furthermore, since mortality (especially during the reproductive years) is 
lower among male elite members (E) than among the general population (G):
c e% / cfr4 < c e% / c f ,V g  (1)
Therefore
,CFR6o > /ceb& =*1 (2)
Hypermortality of hypofecund females should be lower than of hypofecund males, among 
other things because pregnancy and childbearing present health risks which are nonexistent 
for males. It can be made plausible to assume that in females specific mortality risks 
associated with hyperfecundity and hypofecundity in developed countries may roughly 
neutralize each other, such that for females CEB^ = CFR^. Since in modem societies the sex 
ratio does not decrease below unity before age 40, when the most fecund years are already 
over, usually CFR^ < CFR^. Given that about 5-10% of all males may not have the normal 
fecundity of their age (estimated from the 12-18% of permanently childless couples), and 
given that male infecundity partly may be associated with an above average mortality, it can 
be assumed that the effects of sex ratio on sex differentials in the CFR, and the mortality 
selection against hypofecund males also roughly neutralize each other, such that
then (2) is proven. So far, the method of comparison used in previous studies is admissible for 
developed countries.
members should be compared. Relative reproductive success must be measured by comparing 
same cohorts of offspring, not of parent(s).
In the general population mean age at maternity in the three Weston societies rather 
uniformely was about 31 years in the cohorts 1810-1839, and then gradually decreased to 
about 26 years in the cohorts 1930-49, this reduction being more the result of the reduction of 
number of children rather than a decrease in age at marriage. Figures from the last century 
were not available for Japan. It is assumed, that they are in the same range as in the the three 
Western societies, as they actually are from 1920 on.
CFR„ «  CEB-, (3) ? 6
which means, that if it can be shown, that
(4)
Another question is, which cohorts of females of the general population and of male elite
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In a random sample of 343 father-son pairs from the Who-was-Who and the Who-is-Who in 
Great Britain, fathers being bom 1810 and 1919, sons being bom between 1840 and 1949, 
mean age of paternity in this elite group was estimated. Not too surprising, 150 of these father- 
son pairs consisted of owners of an heritable nobility title (often bolstered by a large fortune). 
Interesting is that these 150 pairs did not differ in mean age difference between father and son 
age to the other 193 pairs: The difference was about 38 years throughout the first two thirds of 
the last century, and then decreased down to 32 years for the latest cohorts.
A heritable title in most cases goes to the oldest son. Various studies have shown, that for a 
male being a first son greatly enhances his chances to reach an elite position (for example 
becoming a general in the US military - XXXXX 1991a). Thus, it will be assumed that the 
majority of sons of the non-titled subsample also are first bom sons.
Taking average number of elite children per cohort into consideration, these findings allow to 
set the mean age of paternity among elite members at 42 for the elite cohorts bom in the first 
half of the last country, seeing it gradually coming down to 35 from the 1910-1919 cohort on.
Since the level and changes of maternity age in the general population of the three Western 
nations were close together, it is assumed that level and changes of paternity age among elites 
also were roughly the same. That means that the number of children bom to an elite member 
before 1860-69 will have to be compared to the completed fecundity rates of women of the 
general population who were 11 years younger, the difference coming down to 9 years for the 
youngest cohorts. It is assumed that similar conditions have prevailed in Japan, too. Age 
difference between bride and groom - first marriages - in Japan were 4.2 years in 1920, went 
down to 2.4 in 1980 (Annual report 1988).
2.6. Sex differences in reproductive performance of offspring: This is probably the most 
difficult methodological problem of the study. Fecundity data for males are very rarely 
collected in any kind of census type surveys. Obviously, sex differentials in fecundity require 
sex differentials in nuptality, on which, however, no data are available either. Thus even 
indirect estimations of male fecundity from census data are difficult. The, underreporting in the 
sources of previous marriages, if these ended in divorce, has already been mentioned. Thus, 
since there are no data of the kind which would be required for a rigorous argument, only 
rough estimations are possible. First, since the sex ratio in the reproductive years 20-45 is 
about even, the average cumulative fecundity of males and females in the total population can 
be assumed to be equal. Secondly, one can observe that large sex differentials in variance of 
number of marriages and number of children have been reported exclusively for pre-industrial 
societies. There are two factors closely connected with these differentials: high mortality in 
childbed, and land ownership as the major determinant of wealth and status. High childbed 
mortality means that surviving males from wealthy families had more marriages than 
surviving females; land ownership, because of economics of scale, at all times tended to be 
concentrated in one family member per generation, preferably a male. In both dimensions 
modem societies differ from their predecessors: there was a dramatic decline in childbed
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mortality; wealth in modem market economies in most cases means capital ownership - here 
dividing up an heritage is not a threat to the status of a family’s next generation (Boone 
himself raises that point 1986, 868). As a consequence, in modem, industrialized societies the 
effects of the Trivers-Willard mechanism may be rather weak.
From studies on the fecundity of female members of the elite - who often have an elite 
member as father - of the USA (Kiser and Schacter 1949; Mackey and Coney 1987) and 
Germany (XXXX and YYYYY 1991) it is known, that they are more often unmarried, more 
often childless and, if with children, then with fewer children than male elite members. But 
female elite members are rare, and certainly do not represent an unbiased sample of the 
daughters of male elite members in general. Thus the best guess will be based on a 
comparison between the fecundity differentials between females and males in the top 
education category in the generation of subjects’ offspring. Elites try to provide their 
daughters as well as their sons the best education available in the context of their time. Given 
the ubiquitious tendency for hypergamy, we will assume that a very large part of elite 
daughters will many men with a top educational background, too. Elite members from the 
earliest cohorts (1820-29) saw their children coming into college age around 1875-95, when a 
college or university education even for girls gradually became a realistic option in the upper 
classes. For two of the four countries an analysis with census data has been performed in 
order to estimate sex differences in fecundity on different education levels.
From a 10% sample of the 1971 Census of England and Wales, number of children ever borne 
for women married once, having married before age 45, with duration of marriage 15 years 
and more, was obtained for academic level of wife and of husband (see table 4a). Level 1 has 
been defined as "Higher University Degree or other degrees or equivalent or other 
qualifications higher than GCE (General certificate of education) ’A’ level"; level 2 as "GCE 
’A’ level or equivalent"; level 3 "none of the above" (’A’ level is the the most advanced 
school qualification below college level). These data come from cohorts of females borne 
between app. 1890 - 1935. From a 1% sample of the 1970 Census of West Germany 
analogeous figures were calculated (table 4b)
(insert tables 4a and 4b here)
From these figures it cannot be concluded that females on academic level 1 are less fecund 
than males, once they marry men of equivalent educational background. But there may be 
differences in nuptality. Essock-Vitale (1984,47) found no sex differences in nuptality nor 
fecundity in her Forbes 400 sample of the 400 "richest people in America". In XXXXX’s 
(1991) sample of family histories of 437 West Point graduates sisters with a college degree 
had the same fecundity as their brothers with a college degree. In a dataset containing all 
members of the reigning dynasties in Germany/Austria borne between 1800 and 1939 
(unpublished) no fecundity differences between females and males could be detected. From 
this incomplete material it may be assumed that there are no significant sex differentials in 
fecundity among the offspring of male elite members in the three Western societies. For Japan 
the data situation is even worse, but since sex differences in mortality during reproductive 
years are about the same, and since nuptality rates are not lower and divorce rates are not
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Number of children ever bone, women married once, married under age 45, duration of marriage IS and more years, 
by academic class and academic class of husband (for definition see text). England/Wales: 10% sample of the 1971 
census
education wife academic class 1 academic class 2 academic class 3 
education husband
Table 4a.
academic 2.31 2.10 2.08
flu« 1 n=8679 n=1336 n=8711
academic 2.33 2.07 2.09
class 2 n=2639 n=4992 n=4392
academic 2.08 2.10 2.24
class 3 n=25203 n=11355 n=376858
Table 4b.
Number of children ever borne, ever married women, by academic class and academic class of husband (for 
definition see text). Germany: 1% sample of the 1970 census
education wife academic class 1 academic class 2 academic class 3
education husband
academic 1.88 1.64 1.70
class 1 n=1285 n=288 n=430
academic 1.94 1.77 1.73
flaw 2 n=2409 n=3499 n=3533
academic 1.90 1.89 2.00
class 3 n=4917 n=13205 n=84658
higher than in Western countries it may also be assumed that there are no significant sex 
differentials in fecundity among the offspring of male elite members either.
2.7. Fecundity versus longterm reproductive performance: Since no data are available on 
childlessness or on fecundity variation differentials among elite members* offspring, 
distinguishing between first generation fecundity and longterm reproductive performance can 
be based only on a rough estimation. A clear choice for the purpose of this study nevertheless 
may be possible. From XXXXX's (1991b) analyses of reproductive perfonnance over 2 
generations in families of West Point graduates and of US noncommissioned officers, as well 
as in Norwegian microcensus data (unpublished) it can be safely concluded, that in high status 
groups childlessness als well as fecundity variation is smaller than in the average population. 
Thus any fecundity differential in one generation between a high status group and the 
population average always underestimates the differential in longterm reproduction working 
in favor of the high status group.
2.8. Countries
2.8.1. Germany: Sources were the volumes I-X of "Wer-ist’s?" (Who-is-it?), the 
Reichshandbuch der Deutschen Gesellschaft of 1931, and the volumes of Wer-ist-Wer (Who- 
is-Who) 1955-1989. Germany during the time under observation (births cohorts 1820-1939, 
active years of these men: 1860-1990) went through several revolutions of the whole political 
system, including territorial changes and a 40 year long separation. These upheavals left their 
traces in the sources.
The first source available is the "Wer-ist’s?" of 1905. Later volumes were published in 
intervals of 3-7 years. After the beginning of the Nazi era 1933 only one volume was 
published in 1935, which was purged of a large part of those people who formed the elite 
before 1933 ("because of death and for other reasons several thousand biographies had to be 
deleted” the forword stated cryptically. Among others, Albert Einstein was dropped). In order 
to make a clearcut break with the past, the first "Wer-ist’s?" (this title soon to be changed into 
"Wer-ist-Wer") published after WW n, in 1947, as a principle did not admit any individual 
listed in the 1935 volume. Only gradually some of the latter group reemerged in later 
volumes. The volume 1955 in this sense was the first "normal" volume after the war. The last 
"normal" volume before WW II was published in 1928. In 1931 a monumental volume 
"Reichshandbuch der deutschen Gesellschaft" (Reich’s Handbook of German society) was 
published which contained 12000 biographies of elite members of the late Weimar Republic. 
Quality and completeness of biographical data in this source are superior to the ones in the 
contemporaneous "Wer-ist’s?" volumes. It was used for the birth cohorts 1870-79 and 1880- 
89. In addition, 100 individuals of these cohorts were selected from the Wer-ist-Wer of 1955. 
The problem is a vast underreporting of children in the second sample, maybe because many 
children of these persons died during the war, and were still mourned by their parents. From 
1955 to the present the proportion of persons withholding information about family and 
children is still higher than in the Angloamerican, but also higher than in the prewar German
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sources; from about 1/2 of all listings in 1955 down to about 1/4 of subjects today do not 
provide information on number of children.
Cohort specific life tables from 1871 on have been calculated by Dinkel (1984). There was no 
all German population statistics before 1871. The earliest elite cohorts documented in this 
study were bom in the 1830s and will have had their children from the late 1850s on. It will 
be assumed that life tables for the end of 1850 to the end of 1860 were about the same as the 
1871 life table.
There are no census data on class differentials in fecundity or mortality, threrefore an 
alternative approach was taken. Berlin from the beginning of the 19th century always was the 
largest city, and the largest industrial city in Germany, too. It was the target of an enormous 
internal migration, swelling up to 4 million at the end of the century. The spacial infant 
mortality differential between the best district of Berlin and the average of all Berlin is taken 
as an indicator for the class differential elite/general population. As earliest differential for 
1860-69 is obtained 0.61, 1970-79 0.62, 1880-89 0.63, 1890-99 0.64, 1900-09 0.65, 1910-19 
0.66, 1920-29 0.67, 1930-39 0.68, 1940-49 0.69, 1950-59 0.70, 1960-69 0.71, 1970-79 0.72. 
Accordingly, relative value of a child bom to an elite member of birth cohorts 1830-39 was 
1.39, 1840-49 1.34, 1850-59 1.29, 1860-69 1.25, 1870-79 1.20, 1880-89 1.16, 1890-99 1.12, 
1900-1909 1.08,1910-19 1.04,1920-29 1.03, and since 1930-39 1.02.
In view of the British example, and of the rich material in Seutemann’s (1894) scholarly work, 
class differentials actually may have been larger than regional ones (unlike those in the USA). 
However, if Peller’s (1943) infant mortality rates for the German High Nobility are used 
(which unfortunately are given only for very broad time spans: 1800-1850: 9.6%, 1850-1900: 
4.1%, 1900-30: 0.8%), only slightly higher differentials in reproductive value of a child would 
result: from 1.5 for the child bome to an elite member of birth cohort 1830 down to 1.15 for 
birth cohort 1900.
2.8.2. Great Britain: Sources were Who-was-Who volumes I-VHI, a reference work which 
lists all persons who at the time of their death had been listed in the Who-is-Who, and Who-is- 
Who volumes 1968, 1978 and 1988. In the birth cohorts of the first half of the this century 
there was widespread underreporting of marriages and children (but not as frequent as in the 
American sources). Birth cohorts from 1810-1909 were drawn from the Who-was-Who, 
cohorts 1910-1939 were drawn from the Who-is-Who.
In general, while underreporting is frequent in early cohorts, it becomes much rarer in the later 
cohorts. It is assumed that the results of the survey among German non-respondents also 
apply to British non-respondents; thus, raw data will be corrected according to the principles 
described in 2.2.2..
Generation life tables 1841, 1846 ... to the present have been calculated by Case et al. 1962, 
but unfortunately exist only in handwritten form. Class differentials in infant mortality in the 
broad occupational census classifications have been obtained from Ansell (1874), Bailey and 
Day (1861) and Humphrey (1887) for 1800-1850, from Haines (1985, 891; 1989, 310) for 
1860-1911, from Antonovsky/Bernstein (1977) and Hollingsworth (1981) for 1911-1972. 
Class differentials in infant mortality in Great Britain were considerably higher than in the 
USA.
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Data slightly differed depending on source, therefore by moving averaging the time series had 
to be smoothed. Astonishingly, relative class differentials in infant mortality, between the top 
occupation class and the general population in Great Britain changed only little since 1830 
(same conclusion by Antonovsky 1977). They were about .57 in 1830, were as great as .47 in 
1921, and are now at about 0.60 - 0.65. Accordingly the relative reproductive value of a child 
bom to an elite member of birth cohorts 1790-99,1800-1809,1810-19 was 1.4, 1820-29 1.37, 
1830-39 1.36, 1840-49 1.28, 1850-59 1.23, 1860-69 1.2, 1870-79 1.18, 1880-89 1.11, 1890- 
99 1.11, 1900-1909 1.1, 1910-19 1.09, 1920-29 1.08, 1930-39 1.06, 1940-49 1.05, 1950-59
1.04.
2.8.3. Japan: Sources were volumes 3, 6, 10, 14, 21, 24, 31, 34 (corresponding to years of 
publication 1911, 1921, 1934, 1943, 1961, 1968, 1981, 1987) of Jinji Koshinroku Sha 
(register of gentlemen), Tokyo. In general, the quality and completeness of relevant 
information in the source is very good. About 5-20% of listings - depending on cohort - do not 
give information about children or marriage. However, most of these cases report adopted 
children, which implies that individuals not reporting children are most likely having no 
children rather than withholding information on existing children. Missing information about 
marriages may indicate liaisons with mistresses, but children from these liaisons were always 
listed, sometimes as own children, sometimes as adopted children.
The listings did not mention deceased wives or children, but indicated for every listed child 
birth order in each sex - for example: XY (third son). Thus, as long as youngest son and 
youngest daughter were alive at the time of the listing, number of children ever bom can be 
correctly documented. In order to check which child was youngest son and which child was 
youngest daughter, listed persons were traced back in earlier volumes of the dictionary. 
Because having young mistresses was not uncommon among the elite in earlier days, 
sexagenarians still had babies. Therefore the age limit was set somewhat higher in the 
Japanese data set: all persons of age 65-74 were made eligible. By checking in subsequent 
volumes of Jinji Koshinroku Sha, an attempt was made to narrow down the death year, in 
order to test whether there was a correlation between longevity and number of children 
beyond age 65. No such correlation could be demonstrated.
Because some adopted children in fact may be own children, and because some youngest 
children of either sex may not have been documented, the actual numbers of children may 
even be slightly higher than documented
Noteworthy is the high frequency of businessmen and bankers, and the low frequency of 
authors, artists, media professionals, physicians, lawyers - in comparison to the three Western 
societies. Some of these professions in comparison may actually be less frequent in Japan. 
With regard to infant mortality class differentials and the estimation of the relative 
reproductive value of children, on the other hand, the data situation for Japan is the least 
favorable one of all countries under consideration. It was not possible to locate any cohort 
specific life tables of Japan reaching back to the last century nor any data on class differentials 
in infant mortality in the last century. According to expert opinion such data probably do not 
exist
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All income-mortality correlations obtainable use aggregate data on the prefectural level. It 
seems that mortality differentials until after WW II in Japan were greater between regions 
than between social classes. Japan had income-mortality relationships which resembled the 
Western example not before the post WW II era (Hanley 1974; Mosk and Johansson 1986, 
433). The largest geographical (prefectural level) differentials in the standardized death rates 
for males woe about 1:1.4 in 1908, with the healthiest prefecture displaying a standardized 
death rate for males of 90% of the national average (Mosk and Johansson 1986).
Therefore, instead of own estimations which would not be very reliable anyway, two 
scenarios of class differentials in relative reproductive value of children will be applied: as a 
high differential scenario the Great Britain differentials, and as a low differential scenario the 
US differentials will be used. It is assumed that the Japanese differentials were within the 
boundaries set by these two scenarios.
2.8.4. USA: Sources were volumes I-VEI of the American Who-was-Who, and the Who-is- 
Who 1978 and 1988. Because of underreporting among birth cohorts of the first half of the 
last century the earliest cohorts documented are of 1860-69. Birth cohorts 1860-1909 were 
drawn from the Who-was-Who, 1910-1939 from the Who-is-Who 1969,1979 and 1989. It is 
assumed that the results of the survey among German non-respondents also apply to American 
non-respondents; thus, raw data will be corrected according to the principles described in 
2.2.2..
Generation life tables from 1871 on have been published by Jacobson (1964). Class 
differentials in infant mortality in the broad occupational census classifications have been 
obtained from Haines (1985) and D.S. Smith (1983) for the cohorts before 1900, for cohorts 
1900-1966 from Antonovsky/Bernstein (1977). A characteristic of the United States is that 
class infant mortality differentials until this century have always been smaller than regional 
differentials (see also Hareven and Vinovskis 1975). The infant mortality differential between 
the highest occupation/status class and the average population is approximately 0.80 around 
1900, and coming down to 0.83 in 1966. Accordingly, the relative reproductive value of a 
child bom to an elite member of birth cohort 1870-79 to 1900 -09 is about 1.10, cohort 1910- 
19 1.06; 1920-29 1.04,1930-39 1.03,1940-49 1.02.
3. Results:
The general results can be found for each country in tables 5 -8  and in figures 1-4.
(insert tables 5 -8  and figures 1 -4  here)
The tables give the number of children unweighted and weighted according to the relative 
reproductive value of an elite child in the respective cohort Since there are no class infant 
mortality differentials available for Japan, version I weighted with the US differentials and 
version II weighted with the Great Britian differentials, the lowest and the highest differentials 
among the three Western nations in the study. The figures depict the weighted number of
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TableS
Country: GERMANY
CFR or No of Rel. Value
General children children
Population + Elite Elite
1820-29 5.10* 3.57 4.97
1830-29 5.10* 3.49 4.85
1840-29 5.10* 3.20 4.28
1850-59 5.17 3.18 4.10
1856-65 5.02
1860-69 4.80 2.65 3.31
1866-75 4.47
1870-79 3.98 2.88 3.45
1876-85 3.41
1880-89 2.82 2.23 2.58
1886-95 2.37
1890-99 2.23 2.18 2.44
1896-05 2.08
1900-09 2.02 2.19 2.36
1906-15 1.96
1910-19 1.92 2.37 2.46
1916-25 1.95
1920-29 2.00 2.35 2.42
1926-35 2.16
1930-39 2.16 221 2.32
1936-45 2.07
+ Festy (1979,222,301); UN Demographic Yearbook 1949/50; 1954; 1978 HS; Marschalk (1982,81);
* estimated: a) since there are no cohort specific fertility rates available before 1870-71, the CFR of this cohort was 
taken as the estimated upper limit of the respective rates. The crude fertility rate in 1840 was about 11% higher than 
in 1870, but the Mortality Rates even more so; therefore we estimate the CFR before 1871 as certainly not above the 
one this year - it was probably below it
Table 6
Country: GREAT BRITAIN
CFR of No of Ret. Value
General children children
Population + Elite Elite
1810-19 5.09 3.72 5.21
1816-25 5.01
1820-29 4.97 4.14 5.67
1826-35 5.01
1830-29 4.90 4.01 5.46
1836-45 4.87
1840-29 4.76 3.59 4.60
1846-55 4.56
1850-59 4.26 2.67 3.28
1856-65 3.93
1860-69 3.63 2.46 2.95
1866-75 3.35
1870-79 3.07 2.44 2.88
1876-85 2.79
1880-89 2.51 2.11 2.45
1886-95 2.29
1890-99 2.13 2.14 2.37
1896-05 1.96
1900-09 1.81 2.28 2.51
1906-15 1.83
1910-19 1.91 2.37 2.58
1916-25 2.05
1920-29 2.19 2.61 2.82
1926-35 2.32
1930-39 2.39 2.44 2.58
1936-45 2.28
1940-49 2.48 2.60
+ For cohorts 1790-1826 based on Wrigley and Shofield (1981). CFRs were computed from cohort specific GRRs, 
using a sex proportion of 104.5, which was documented in 1821 (Wrigley and Shofield 1981,591); for later cohorts 
Festy (1979,126,262)
1810-19
1816-25
1820-29
1826-35
Table 7
Country: JAPAN
CFR or No of Rel. Value
General children children
Population + Elite Elite
1830-29 4.00* 3.31 3.64 (4.63)
1836-45
1840-29 4.00* 4.62 5.08 (6.47)
1846-55
1850-59 4.00* 5.28 5.81 (7.23)
1856-65
1860-69 4.00* 4.77 5.25 (5.72)
1866-75
1870-79 4.30* 3.96 4.36 (4.59)
1876-85 4.37
1880-89 4.37 3.76 3.98 (4.36)
1886-95 4.39
1890-99 4.41 3.13 3.26 (3.48)
1896-05 4.38
1900-09 4.31 2.61 2.68 (2.87)
1906-15 4.02
1910-19 3.44 1.98 2.01 (2.15)
1916-25 2.99
1920-29 2.44 1.80 1.84 (1.94)
1926-35 121
1930-39 2.04 2.00 2.04 (2.12)
1936-45 1.97
1940-49 1.89**
1946-55 1.75**
+ Calculated from census data of 1950, 1960, 1970 (numb« of children ever bone to ever married women; and 
proportion of never married women per cohort) Department of Statistics (1985, 848), and Institute of Population 
Problems (1989,29)
* estimated
** estimated from TFRs of 1975,1980,1985. Statistical Yearbook of Japan (1989)
CFR of No of Rel. Value
General children children
Population Elite Elite 
white women +
Table 8
Country: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1810-19
1820-29
1826-35
1830-29
1836-45
1840-29
1846-55
1850-59
1856-65 4.06
1860-69 2.56 2.81
1866-75 3.76
1870-79 3.53 2.35 2.59
1876-85 3.35
1880-89 3.16 2.15 2.28
1886-95 2.98
1890-99 2.74 1.97 2.05
1896-05 2.48
1900-09 2.30 1.90 1.96
1906-15 226
1910-19 2.42 2.44 2.49
1916-25 2.69
1920-29 2.94 3.13 3.19
1926-35 3.07
1930-39 2.97 2.61 2.66
1936-45 2.55
1940-49 2.41
+ Festy (1979,235,290); The Statistical History of the United States of America, US Bureau of the Census (1982, 
53)
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children of the elite per birth cohort of elite members together with the completed fecundity 
rates for the general population. In the figures the CFRs for the general population have been 
shifted 9 years to the left, in order to compensate for different generation length (see 2.5.). 
Note, that in the tables this shift has not been made.
Sex ratios of offspring in the sample did not differ conspicuously from the sex ratios in the 
general populations: Germany 113.83 (1473:1294); England 96.33 (1706:1771) (titled 
landowers: 78.77 (167:212), all others: 99.81 (1539:1550) Footnote 1); Japan 102.40 
(1880:1836); USA 110.90 (1180:1064). Very few adopted children were listed in the sources; 
no specific analysis was performed.
Analyses of covariance of the effects of occupation/profession of elite members on number of 
children, with cohort effects controlled showed no effect. There are two exceptions:
1) Landowning nobility and titled gentry had the same fecundity as commoners in all nations, 
save in Germany in the cohorts between 1820-1859. Here individuals with these 
characteristics had about 10% more children than their contemporaries in the elite. Making up 
for about 10% of all listings in these cohorts, they do not have an impact on the general 
findings.
2) In Germany and Great Britain, non-catholic clergymen had 5-10% more children than the 
rest of the national elite. In both countries, these individuals account for app. 2-3% of the 
listings per cohort Likewise, an college/university education had no effect From these 
findings it follows that any bias by profession in the selection of elite members in the listings 
of the sources has no effect on the findings of this study.
In addition, for Great Britain, Germany and the USA figures 5 to 7 give the fecundity 
differentials in number of children, weighted for reproductive value, for elites and for the 
"professions", the top occupation class in the census classification. Number of children was 
weighted in order to make the graphs comparable to the other figures; infant mortality was 
assumed to be the same for the professionals and the elites.
(insert figures 5 -7  here)
4. Discussion
Great Britain is the easiest case to interpret. Figure 2 depicts a positive fecundity differential 
of the British elite over the general population from the beginning of the 19th century on. 
Germany also displays a positive differential, save for the birth cohorts 1840-1869. The 
British data display their minimum of the positive differentials exactly for the same cohort, 
which lends supports to the interpretation that this temporary depression is not an artefact. The 
depression cannot result from an overestimation of the childlessness - in our estimations the 
maximum of 15% has been assumed for the birth cohorts 1880-1910. It is easy to see that 
even if we estimate childlessness for the elite cohorts 1840-69 being lower than 10% this 
would not alter the below average fecundity for the elite during this time. Furthermore, it
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seems difficult to explain the depression as the result of underestimating the class differential 
in infant mortality rates. The male elite members of the cohorts 1840-69 had their child 
bearing years between 1870-1914, a time of considerable general hygienic and medical 
improvements over the first two thirds of the 19th century. Consequently one should expect 
the class differentials in infant mortality to decrease, not to widen. Even if the infant mortality 
rates for the German High Nobility were taken as representative for all elite children, (Peller 
1943, see 2.8.1.), the relative reproductive value of an elite child would not increase 
substantially for the depression cohorts. On the other hand, it seems to be implausible that the 
positive differentials before and after these ca. 30 depression cohorts are incorrect: at least for 
the cohorts from 1870 on because of shrinking absolute infant mortality the data base 
becomes even more reliable, the error margin smaller. Thus, the depression in reproduction 
differentials for the elite birth cohorts 1840-69 probably is as real as the positive differentials 
before and thereafter, it may reflect the fact that demographic transition, which itself can be 
seen as an adaptation of reproductive strategies to a changing environment, took place earlier 
in the elites. In addition, there is a clear positive fecundity differential of elite members over 
the average professional, the average members of the elites’ own marriage market in both 
countries for the whole time period observed.
The situation in Japan probably has to be interpreted along sim ilar lines. The two scenarios of 
class differentials in infant mortality do not make much difference in those birth cohorts for 
which the numbers suggest a negative differential for the elites. One can argue that the class 
differentials in infant mortality began to decrease considerably later than in the West (Hanley 
1974), and consequently, that the relative reproductive value of a child bom to an elite 
member was even higher for the crucial birth cohort 1870/80 to 1910/20 than estimated even 
in the high differential scenario. But again, the alternative interpretation also cannot be 
rejected out of hand, that demographic transition took place earlier in the elites than in the 
general population, thereby giving the latter a genuinely positive fecundity differential among 
these cohorts. In any case, however, also in Japan the most recent cohorts indicate a positive 
fecundity differential of elites over the general population.
The case of the United States is the most difficult one to interpret. The synchronicity of 
downward and upward trends in both the general population and elite members forbids any 
interpretation of demographic transition taking place at different times. Whoever wants to find 
a positive fecundity differential for the elites from the beginning of the observation period on, 
would have to argue that the differentials in infant mortality rates were much higher for the 
elite than for the top major occupation class in the censuses, which is, given the relatively low 
infant mortality rates from the beginning of this century on, not very likely. More probable 
seems the interpretation, that in the US with her fast growing population and enormous 
quantities of immigrants especially before WW I there may have been a genuine below 
average fecundity of elites, until the arrival of the cohorts which caused the baby boom of the 
50s and early 60s. From these cohorts on, the differentials are positive for the elites. Easier to 
determine are the fecundity differentials of elite members over the average member of the top 
occupational census class, which were always positive.
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The possibly great impact of differential fecundity variation on longterm reproductive success 
has already been mentioned. A computer simulation over 20 generations based on fecundity 
data over two generations of family lineages, in which a sample of West Point graduates was 
compared with a sample of retired US noncommissioned officers (XXXXX 1991b) suggested 
that the average longtenn reproductive success of the former group may be 2 - 3 times as high 
than of the latter. The upperclasses, maybe because of their greater economic security, maybe 
because of other reasons, seem to reproduce more steadily, with fewer family members 
remaining childless. This greater steadiness (lower fecundity variation) alone guarantees a 
positive reproduction differential. On the other hand, there is no hint that elite children have a 
fecundity below the average of their marriage market The sons of the British father-and-son 
pairs had a fecundity of 105% (p < .08) of their birth cohorts in the Who-is-Who. In the USA 
children borne into high status groups were found to have a higher fecundity than upstarts 
(Baltzell 1953; Tomasson 1966). Therefore it can be safely concluded that the differentials for 
longterm reproduction may be even more in favor of the elite than the differentials of 
fecundity in one generation indicate which were found in this study. Based on these findings 
we can assume, that not only the elites but also high status groups like the occupation census 
classes, even where they show a small negative fecundity differential nevertheless may have a 
higher longtenn reproduction than the average population.
5. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to determine, whether there is a positive reproduction 
differential for the elites in modem societies, in comparison with the total population, and in 
comparison with the average member of the top occupation census class (professions and 
managerial positions) of their societies. It has been argued that any cross sectional 
comparisons are not convincing, and that only a positive differential over longer periods of 
time can be accepted as evidence. Measured with this yardstick, the hypothesis has been 
proven for Great Britain, and made very likely for Japan and Germany. The situation may be 
complicated by the demographic transition which occurred in elite families earlier than 
elsewhere in society. In Japan class differentials neither for infant mortality nor for fecundity 
were available. The case of the United States remains inconclusive. Perhaps the unique 
situation of a population with a constant influx of hyperfecund immigrants can account for the 
negative fecundity differential for the elite birth cohorts 1860-1919. On the other hand, the 
elite always displayed a positive fecundity differential over the top occupation census class. In 
the USA, however, as in the other three nations, the most recent elite cohorts included in the 
study displayed a positive fecundity differential over the general population. Together with 
theoretical and empirical results on a lower fecundity variation within family lineages in high 
status groups the findings allow to argue that elite members in these four major industrial 
nations have been reproductively more successful than the average members of their own 
marriage market, as well as the average members of their societies as a whole.
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Footnote 1
The bias in the sex ratio for the titled landowners could be straightforwardly explained by the 
Trivers-Willard hypothesis, if it can be made plausible that the titled gentry and nobility 
actually formed a closed marriage market
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